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Searching for new rationale …
Bertelsmann Forschungsgruppe Politik
Since the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in two of the EU’s found-
ing member states in spring 2005, much has been said about the gap between the
European Union and its citizens. The strong “Non” and “Nee” of the French und
Dutch voters were not only a simple vote on the content of the constitutional text.
Rather, they unveiled great deficits in achieving a legitimate and acceptable politi-
cal order at the European level. One of the main points blamed for being respon-
sible for the EU’s democratic deficit has been the lack of social legitimacy.
Therefore, European actors have increased their efforts on communicating Euro-
pean values aiming at re-gaining public support for the European integration pro-
cess and at establishing the grounds for a European sense of belonging.
The formation of such a sense of belonging requires – apart from other features
such as the right to participate in the political decision-making process – a certain
consensus on values, principles and beliefs. The German EU presidency, which
took office on January 1, 2007, stressed the importance of a common European
base of values for further deepening and widening the EU. Chancellor Angela
Merkel actively contributed to the debate on a European value community.
Especially the Berlin Declaration, which was drafted by the German presidency
and published on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome on
March 25, 2007, is meant to symbolise the principles, which the EU is built on and
strengthen citizens’ empathy for the Union.
But how does the European citizenry react to this strategy of communicating
values? Do the German presidency’s contributions stimulate a public debate about
European values? And can they strengthen citizens’ support for the European
Union? 
1. Stimulating the European Value Debate – The German Government’s
Contributions
Confronted with signs of the EU’s declining popularity, Merkel stressed the need
for finding a “new rationale to the historical reasons for the foundation of the
European Union” (Neubegründung Europas) as early as in May 2006. As she
argued, the narrative of Europe as a “community of pacific interests”
(Friedensgemeinschaft), once the central reference point for legitimising European
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integration, had lost its appeal. Even if the unification of the European continent,
which was almost completed with the Union’s fifth and biggest enlargement round
in 2004/2007, was a great historical achievement after the disastrous experience of
two World Wars, this pattern of justification is not sufficient any more to ensure
popular support for the Union. As Merkel acknowledged, a new narrative has to be
found which can clearly be attributed to the EU. The Chancellor’s approach is two-
fold: on the one hand, the Union’s output capacity is to be strengthened to provide
the citizens with significant results. On the other hand, the Union should be devel-
oped towards a community of values. Merkel referred to inclusive and universal
values as they are laid down in the Union’s Treaties such as peace, freedom, democ-
racy and human rights.
In further appearances, Merkel has tried to specify the European uniqueness. As
homage to Jacques Delors she stressed the necessity to find “Europe’s soul” as a
crucial prerequisite for further integrating the Union. Merkel focused on two
dominant keywords: tolerance and diversity. Without tolerance, Merkel argued, the
European Union’s unity in diversity-slogan falls short in defining “what holds
Europe together in its innermost being, what defines its soul.”However, although
Merkel acknowledged the need to find a specific and exclusive explanation for
Europe’s character, it can be doubted whether the argument that “Europe’s soul is
tolerance”is more persuasive than the unity in diversity-concept.
Merkel’s policy statement at the EU Spring Summit in the German Bundestag on
March 1, 2007 marked a turn regarding her communication strategy. As Merkel
tries to express: Projects show Europe’s nature – by linking the Union’s values with
concrete policy projects, values become comprehensible. Therefore, the German
Chancellor focussed on two main tasks of the presidency: the social dimension of
the Union’s economic policy and the efforts regarding a common European climate
and energy policy. As specific European projects both policy fields can in a sense
be viewed from a value based perspective and therefore enable identification with
Europe.
2. The Berlin Declaration – European Values in a Nutshell?
Angela Merkel’s contributions to the value debate were aimed at paving the way for
publishing the Berlin Declaration. As a major project of the German EU presiden-
cy, the Declaration’s central goal was to provide citizens with a short and catchy
document, which reflects the uniqueness of the European Union and serves as a
reference point for people’s sense of belonging. As the first European commemora-
tion document, it was signed by the acting presidency, the European Commission
and the European Parliament after all 27 Heads of State and Government had
agreed on the content of the text.
The first part of the Declaration points out the major successes of the European
integration process. The document mentions peace, prosperity, democracy, rule of
law, the common market and the Euro to convince the reader of the Union’s added
value. Due to divergent points of view, the EU’s enlargement policy and further
controversial topics are not mentioned explicitly. As concerns the “common ideals”
shared by EU member states, institutions and citizens, the focus is put on univer-
sal values: dignity of man, human rights, gender equality, peace, freedom, democ-
racy, rule of law, mutual respect, shared responsibility, prosperity, security, toler-
ance, participation, justice and solidarity. To underline the specific European
Least common denominator
Positive side effect
Supporting universal values
Seeger · Communicating European Values
C·A·P Aktuell · 6 · 2007 Seite 3
dimension of those values, the Declaration refers to “the democratic interaction of
the member states and the European institutions”. Furthermore, the principles of
diversity and plurality and a “supportive cooperation” among all EU actors are
stressed.
With regard to the high expectations the German Chancellor had raised in view of
the Declaration’s ability to symbolise the EU’s moral core, the wording of the docu-
ment is rather disappointing. The heavy struggles about the concrete content of the
text among the EU member states in the run-up of the Declaration’s publication
dashed the hope to find a comprehensive formula of the EU’s unique nature.
Rather, the text represents the least common denominator of how the history and
sense of European integration can be interpreted. Thus, it is unlikely that the
Declaration can serve as a starting point for a new European self-conception.
Firstly, the proposed principles do not represent a “new rationale”for the European
integration process. The values expressed in the Declaration are already incorporat-
ed in the EU’s legal documents and have been communicated for a long time –
without generating a stable European feeling of belonging. Secondly, the strategy
of keeping the negotiations secret during the Declaration’s drafting process is
highly counterproductive to the aim of creating a document representing the
whole European citizenry. It should be questioned whether citizens will accept the
Declaration as symbol for constructing their own identity as it is a product of delib-
eration among political elites. Therefore, the impact of the Declaration on its major
addressee – each European citizen – is likely to be much more moderate than its
signatories have promised.
Nevertheless, the Declaration might turn out to have a significant effect on anot-
her addressee, namely the EU member states. Even if only the German EU presi-
dency and not every single Head of State and Government signed the Declaration,
it reflects a common consensus and each government’s commitment to go beyond
the Union’s legal status quo. As it is mentioned, the aim is to place “the European
Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in
2009.” Bearing in mind the confusion and lack of orientation, which were caused
by the negative outcome of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, the
Declaration can thus be seen as a remarkable step forward – even if its ambitious
aim to facilitate citizens’ empathy for the EU is unlikely to be fulfilled.
3. Debating European Values – the Public’s own Agenda
The German EU presidency – as well as other European actors – seems to prefer
an inclusive and universal communication strategy when trying to actively set the
European value debate agenda. Even if there is a tendency to stress specific policy
programmes, there is no comprehensive European narrative, which could unfold
an integrative power similar to the Friedensgemeinschaft-pattern or Jacques Delors’
project of the common market. How does the public respond to these efforts of
communicating values?
When asked about the most important personal values, Europeans mention peace
(52%), respect for human life (43%) and human rights (41%). With regard to the
European Union, human rights (38%), democracy (38%) and peace (36%) as most
important values are mentioned (see Eurobarometer 66). At a first glance, the an-
swers seem to indicate a high support for the values communicated by the German
presidency. However, the question has to be raised why despite an obvious support
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for the general European principles an alarming alienation between the Union and
its citizens can be observed.
Other indicators such as the controversial debates on the possible accession of
Turkey, immigration policy and the integration capacity of the European Union
might give a more detailed insight in European citizens’ value and identity con-
cepts. Even if the issue of European values is not directly raised, all these topics
allow for drawing conclusions on how they might be defined. The arguments put
forward in the debates indicate the fact that a universal and inclusive definition of
European values might not be enough to create a stable common European iden-
tity. Rather, it seems that there is an additional demand for an exclusive definition
of what should be regarded as European.
As long as the Union was no major reference point for people’s political awareness,
the strategy of defining the EU’s character merely by universal and inclusive values
did not cause deeper problems. However, as the Union’s policies will increasingly
depend upon a popular vote – e.g. as it will be the case in France concerning
future enlargements – the question of how close the ties are between the European
Union and its citizens will gain great significance. The normative claim for a well-
developed sense of belonging as a legitimising factor of a political entity is there-
fore reinforced by the pragmatic need for a sustainable support for further integra-
ting the EU.
Without any doubt, values like democracy, human rights, rule of law and equality
are the most crucial achievements of Western civilizations. They enable a peaceful
co-existence of plural beliefs and norms. As regards the European Union, they offer
the opportunity to cope with the different traditions and backgrounds of 27 and
more member states (promoted by the Union’s identity concept of unity in diver-
sity). However, it is doubtful whether an open, inclusive concept is sufficient to facili-
tate social cohesion, solidarity and identity. Political entities are usually charac-
terised through specific features, which allow for a clear attribution. If the EU
wants to be recognised as a political entity on its own and if the European constitu-
ency shall legitimise further integration steps, the inclusive and universal values
will have to be interpreted from a unique European point of view.
4. Value Debate Catalysts: Projects and Politicisation
As has been tried to express by the German EU presidency, linking the EU’s values
with specific projects can clarify the difference between the Union and other politi-
cal entities. Therefore, a new “master project”has to be identified, which can facili-
tate support and empathy among European citizens. The German presidency focu-
sed on two major projects – the European social model and the energy and clima-
te policy. The European social model is not only understood as a guarantee for a
minimum in living quality, but symbolises certain values such as solidarity, non-
discrimination, gender equality and workers’ rights.“Europe stands for a combina-
tion of strong economic performance and a fair deal for all members of society“, as
Merkel put it. Hence, one could perceive the idea of establishing the European
social model as perfectly adequate to serve as an identity-building instrument –
not least as the concept picks up the most serious concerns citizens have regarding
their future: unemployment, rising costs of living and decreasing pensions (see
Special Eurobarometer 273).
Energy and climate policy
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But the concept faces serious problems. The main competencies in the field of so-
cial policy still remain within the nation states; the Union’s abilities to shape the
European social model are extremely weak. Furthermore, the diversity of 27
European social models is a crucial obstacle when it comes to defining and imple-
menting one single European social model. Therefore, raising expectations on the
one side by actively communicating the values and principles of a social Europe
and the lack of decision-making competences on the other side might turn out to
be highly counterproductive to the aim of enhancing citizens’trust towards the EU.
As regards the Union’s efforts to build a common European energy and climate
policy, central requirements for a new European identity project seem to be ful-
filled: especially the climate policy can be interpreted from a value perspective and
thus generate a certain degree of identification. Moreover, this policy field affects
every citizen in Europe. Furthermore, measures are currently adopted to provide
the European level with adequate competencies. However, the European Union
cannot deliver significant results in this policy field by itself. Only a global ap-
proach, which also involves other major energy consumers like the United States
or China, can lead to visible successes. Promoting climate policy as new European
“master project”therefore inheres a serious risk. Not being able to deliver accept-
able results might lead to the “Lisbon dilemma”– the ambitious aims of the Lisbon
strategy could not be realised adequately, which led to a deep loss of credibility of
the project.
Enhancing a European sense of belonging by bringing forward the “Europe of
results”can only succeed if the values, which the policy projects are based on, are
made clear. The fact that, until now, there is no final consensus on how European
values and identity are characterised should not be seen as an obstacle to con-
structing a common feeling of belonging. Even the nation states lack an ultimate
definition of identity due to its constructed and therefore alterable nature. Values
and beliefs need an open communication sphere where they can be debated and
(re-)interpreted. Thus, the public debates about European identity and its consti-
tutive attributes should be regarded as a signal that European citizens are begin-
ning to communicate about the same topics with similar interpretation patterns –
what better way to demonstrate the slow, but constant emergence of a common
European public sphere which can build the ground for a European demos? 
However, the passiveness, with which European actors have reacted to the own
dynamic the public debates are developing, is worrying. Instead of picking up the
demand for finding a specific definition of the European character with inclusive
as well as with exclusive attributes, European actors rather point to universal
values and omit controversial issues. Even if raising certain topics might provoke
conflict and dispute, this should not be seen as an excuse to be silent on issues like
further enlargements. This could be interpreted as dishonesty and lead to a mas-
sive loss of credibility. Other actors are likely to engage in the debate with popu-
list interpretations of how the distinction between European and non-European
can be made. As a result, the EU might face the risk to lose its power of interpre-
tation. Therefore, an open communication process has to be stimulated where
European actors take their responsibility and actively contribute to the debates –
even if the topics raised might be inconvenient.
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In the long run, mere communication efforts will not be enough. Politics in demo-
cratic entities need clear alternatives, which allow for a choice between different
political points of view. Political controversies can best be tackled within adequate
institutional and structural arrangements. The instruments provided by the
Constitutional Treaty would be a remarkable step forward compared to the status
quo: by further strengthening the EP’s competences, by linking the appointment of
the Commission’s president to the EP election results or by strengthening the role
of national parliaments the EU would be further politicised. The intended reforms
would contribute to a vital democracy where cross-border debates about norms
and values become a natural part of the political process. Thus, if the acting
German EU presidency can realise its aim to put the constitutional process back on
track this would probably be the most efficient and sustainable way to narrow the
gap between the European Union and its citizens.
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